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“Chartering” in the Shadow of
Lochner: Guindon, Goodwin and the
Criminal-Administrative Distinction
at the Supreme Court of Canada
Steven Penney

I. INTRODUCTION
The distinction between criminal and administrative wrongdoing
plays a key role in Canadian public law. Though it functions somewhat
differently across domains, the upshot is the same: the state is
presumptively entitled, as a principle of statutory and constitutional
interpretation, to more favourable procedures for establishing administrative
wrongdoing than criminal offending. Conversely, people accused of
administrative infractions are presumptively entitled to less protection
against state power in the investigative and adjudicative process than
those charged with crimes (or in many cases, regulatory offences).
The criminal-administrative distinction has a long pedigree,1 but has
taken on heightened importance since the Charter.2 The entrenchment of
the Charter’s “legal rights” provisions emboldened lawyers to claim the
same procedural protections for persons accused of non-criminal
wrongdoing that statute and common law had typically (but not
universally) provided to criminal defendants. With few exceptions, these
claims have failed. Despite long-standing criticism of its doctrinal


Faculty of Law, University of Alberta. The author wishes to thank Caitlyn Field
(J.D. 2017) for research assistance and the organizers of, and participants at, the 19th Annual
Constitutional Cases Conference at Osgoode Hall Law School at York University.
1
See, e.g., Beaver v. The Queen, [1957] S.C.J. No. 32, [1957] S.C.R. 531 (S.C.C.), varg
[1956] O.J. No. 342 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Pierce Fisheries Ltd., [1970] S.C.J. No. 58, [1971] S.C.R. 5
(S.C.C.), revg [1969] N.S.J. No. 103 (N.S.C.A.); R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] S.C.J. No. 59, [1978]
2 S.C.R. 1299 (S.C.C.), affg 13 O.R. (2d) 113 (Ont. C.A.).
2
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter the “Charter”].
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coherence and policy justifications, the Supreme Court of Canada has
repeatedly confirmed the distinction’s vitality and applied it to deny
Charter challenges by persons deemed to be operating in the administrative
sphere. The Court has been far more willing, in contrast, to find Charter
violations in the criminal context.
The Court’s 2015 decisions in Guindon v. Canada3 and Goodwin
v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles)4 did little to
change this. In each case, the Court decided that persons facing
substantial penalties for issuing fraudulent tax receipts and impaired
driving, respectively, were not “charged with an offence” under section 11
of the Charter. They were thus not entitled to the numerous rights
guaranteed by that provision, including the right “to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing
by an independent and impartial tribunal” under paragraph (d). The Court
in Goodwin did find, however, that aspects of the process violated the
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure in section 8 of the
Charter.
What accounts for the Court’s enduring reluctance to require
administrative penalty regimes, as a constitutional mandate, to adhere to
the basic procedural protections applying even to low-level criminal and
quasi-criminal prosecutions? There are likely many answers. But one is
the Court’s admitted fear that doing so would frustrate governments’
ability to regulate economic activity in the public interest.
This article’s aim is to trace the origins of this fear and assess its
legitimacy. The fear stems largely from a century-old decision from the
Supreme Court of the United States, the infamous Lochner v. New York.5
By the second half of the last century, jurists in the United States and
Canada had come to view Lochner as the embodiment of an almost
universally derided era of constitutional law. The Lochner Court, in their
view, used a rigid and formalist interpretation of the Bill of Rights to
limit state efforts to enact and enforce progressive economic legislation.
Mindful of that experience, Canadian judges interpreting the Charter
in the last decades of the 20th century drew a bright line between

3
[2015] S.C.J. No. 41, 2015 SCC 41, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.), affg [2013] F.C.J. No. 673
(F.C.A.) [hereinafter “Guindon“].
4
[2015] S.C.J. No. 46, 2015 SCC 46, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 250 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Goodwin“].
5
198 U.S. 45 (1905) [hereinafter “Lochner“].
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administrative and criminal regulation, granting the state a largely
unfettered freedom in the former and imposing often exacting constraints
in the latter.
Lochner-era jurisprudence is (mostly) deserving of its reputation, and
some lines between administrative and criminal law are certainly
defensible. But Canadian courts’ fear of Lochner has been excessive and
caused them to underestimate the threat that administrative regulation
poses to individual liberty. Criminal penalties are often harsher and more
stigmatizing than administrative ones, and criminal defendants typically
more vulnerable, disadvantaged and disempowered than many of the
persons (natural and corporate) subject to administrative regulation.
But not always. Legislatures have increasingly relied on administrative
and civil enforcement regimes to address forms of wrongdoing
previously left to the criminal law.6 In many instances, the sanctions
accompanying these regimes are harsh, the targets are ordinary people,
and the rules protecting adjudicative fairness are weak.7
As currently formulated, however, the criminal-administrative
distinction is ill-suited to manage this phenomenon. I focus on the test
used to decide whether a person is “charged with an offence” under
section 11 of the Charter, which hinges on the distinction between
criminal and administrative regulation. I argue that the current test is
rigid and formalistic (ironically, much like Lochner) and advocate for a
more flexible, functional and purposive interpretation that puts a greater
burden on government to justify elisions of adjudicative fairness norms.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I briefly
recount the history of the Lochner era, including Lochner’s Fourth and
Fifth Amendment8 analogue, Boyd v. United States.9 Part III examines
Canadian courts’ reaction to Lochner and relates the formation of the
6
See D. McLeod, “Facing the Consequences: Should the Charter Apply to Administrative
Proceedings Involving Monetary Penalties?” (2012) 30 N.J.C.L. 59; W. Michael G. Osborne,
“Raising the AMPerage: The Spread of Administrative Monetary Penalties In Canada” (2011),
online: <http://www.thelitigator.ca/2011/01/raising-the-amperage>; R.M. Brown, “Administrative
and Criminal Penalties in the Enforcement of Occupational Health and Safety Legislation” (1992) 30
Osgoode Hall L.J. 691.
7
See, e.g., Doyon v. Canada (Attorney General), [2009] F.C.J. No. 605, 2009 FCA 152,
at paras. 20-29 (F.C.A.).
8
U.S. Const. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”); amend. V, cl. 3
(no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself”).
9
116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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administrative-regulatory distinction in the jurisprudence interpreting
sections 7, 8, and 11 of the Charter. In Part IV, I examine Guindon and
Goodwin and propose a more expansive interpretation of section 11,
arguing that such an interpretation poses no Lochnerian threat to the
Canadian welfare state. Part V concludes.
II. THE LOCHNER ERA
The story of Lochner is well known. In 1906, the Supreme Court
struck down a New York law prohibiting bakery employees from
working more than 10 hours a day or 60 hours a week. The Court
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause10 to protect
employers’ and employees’ rights to contract freely for labour. These
rights could be superseded by the state’s “police” power to limit
contractual freedom for the purposes of “safety, health, morals and
general welfare of the public”,11 but only for a “fair, reasonable and
appropriate exercise” of that power.12 The New York law, the Court
adjudged, did not meet this standard, its relationship to health being
remote at best.13 Instead, it constituted an “illegal interference with the
rights of individuals, both employers and employees, to make contracts
regarding labor upon such terms as they may think best …”.14 Laws that
simply imposed maximum hours without an adequate health or safety
justification, Peckham J. wrote, “are mere meddlesome interferences
with the rights of the individual”.15
Lochner spawned more than two decades of decisions invalidating
labour and other public welfare legislation on due process grounds.16 Not
every exercise of the police power was struck down, but the rulings did
significantly limit legislatures’ capacity to insulate workers from the
10
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1, cl. 3 (“No state shall … deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law”).
11
Lochner, supra, note 5, at 53.
12
Id., at 56.
13
Id., at 58-61.
14
Id., at 61.
15
Id.
16
See, e.g., Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations of State of Kansas,
262 U.S. 522 (1923); Schnaier v. Navarre Hotel & Importation Co., 70 L.R.A. 722 (1905); Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917). The Lochner Court also struck
down numerous federal laws under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. See e.g., Adkins v.
Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908). See U.S.
Const. amend. V, cl. 4 (“No person shall be … deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law”).
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rigours of the market.17 However, in the face of the Great Depression and
an emerging political consensus in favour of greater social welfare and
governmental intervention in the economy, the Court eventually
retreated, becoming increasingly willing to justify economic regulation
as a reasonable limit on contractual freedom.18 And in its 1937 decision
in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, it all but repudiated Lochner, upholding a
minimum wage law for women and declaring that legislatures should
have “a wide field of discretion” to regulate employer-employee relations
to not only protect health and safety, but also promote “peace and
good order” and “insure wholesome conditions of work and freedom
from oppression”.19
Less well known is the Lochner era’s criminal procedure
jurisprudence. The keystone case, Boyd v. United States,20 was decided
19 years before Lochner. Boyd displayed the same natural rights-based,
formalist conception of the Bill of Rights as Lochner, as well as the same
hostility to governmental regulation of private economic activity.21
In 1884, the Boyd company contracted with the United States government
to supply imported glass for a federal building.22 Suspecting fraud,
customs officials seized one of Boyd’s shipments, brought a civil
forfeiture action, and obtained a subpoena requiring Boyd to produce the
invoice from a previous shipment.23 Boyd complied, but claimed
violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The Supreme Court

See generally Cass R. Sunstein, “Lochner‘s Legacy” (1987) 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873;
David E. Bernstein, “Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental
Rights Constitutionalism” (2003) 92 Geo. L.J. 1; Victoria F. Nourse, “A Tale of Two Lochners: The
Untold History of Substantive Due Process and the idea of Fundamental Rights” (2009) 97 Cal. L.
Rev. 751.
18
See generally Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 2d ed. (Mineola, NY:
The Foundation Press, 1988), §§8-5 – 8-7 [hereinafter “Tribe”].
19
300 U.S. 379, at 393 (1937).
20
116 U.S. 616, at 617 (1886) [hereinafter “Boyd“].
21
See Akhil Reed Amar, “Fourth Amendment First Principles” (1994) 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757,
at 791 [hereinafter “Amar”]; Morgan Cloud, “The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era:
Privacy, Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory” (1996) 48 Stan. L. Rev. 555, at 579-81
[hereinafter “Cloud”].
22
See “Boyd v. United States” in Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper, eds., Landmark
Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional Law, vol. 8
(Arlington, VA: University Publications of America, 1975), at 480-85, 506-509; Donald Dripps,
“‘Dearest Property’: Digital Evidence and the History of ‘Private Papers’ as Special Objects of
Search and Seizure” (2013) 103 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 49, at 95-97.
23
The subpoena was obtained pursuant to Act of 22 June 1874, c. 391, § 5, 18 Stat. 187
(19 U.S.C. § 535 (2015)).
17
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agreed and excluded the invoice as evidence against Boyd.24 Applying
what would later become known as the “mere evidence” rule,25 it
declared that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the government from
taking of non-illicit property for evidentiary purposes, even if it had
ample grounds for suspicion and a warrant for the seizure.26 It further
proclaimed that compelling Boyd to provide the invoice violated the
Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause.27 “Compulsory discovery”
or “compelling the production of … private books and papers”, Bradley
J. wrote, is “contrary to the principles of a free government” and “cannot
abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom”.28
As William Stuntz has pointed out, though Boyd is considered a
cornerstone of turn-of-the-century constitutional criminal procedure,
during the Lochner era it had only a limited effect on ordinary criminal
cases.29 Most criminal law was (and remains) state law, and the Supreme
Court did not “incorporate” the Fourth and Fifth Amendments into the
Fourteenth (thereby applying them to the states) until the 1960s.30
Further, on its face, Boyd only prohibited the seizure or compulsory
production of documents.31 During the late 19th and early 20th centuries,
police rarely sought this type of evidence during criminal investigations.32

24
Boyd, supra, note 20. See also Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), 41 S. Ct.
261 [hereinafter “Gouled“].
25
Courts began using this phrase to describe the Boyd/Gouled rule in the 1930s. See, e.g.,
Foley v. United States, 64 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1933), cert denied, 289 U.S. 762 (1933); Landau v.
United States, 82 F.2d 285, at 287 (2nd Cir. 1936), cert denied, 56 S. Ct. 747 (1936). See generally 8
Wigmore, Evidence, §2184a (McNaughton rev., 1961) (defining “mere evidence” as anything
“which is neither contraband nor tools nor fruits of crime, but which consists of private documents
or other chattels of the defendant wanted by the government solely for its evidential value”).
26
Boyd, supra, note 20, at 623.
27
Id., at 633. The Court concluded that while the forfeiture proceeding was nominally civil
in nature, for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment it was “in substance and effect a criminal one”:
id., at 634. In separate, unreported proceedings, the owners of the company were also convicted
criminally. Though the ruling does not appear in the decision, the Supreme Court also vacated their
criminal conviction. See Dripps, supra, note 22, at 96.
28
Boyd, supra, note 20, at 631-32. See also Gouled, supra, note 24, at 303-304.
29
William J. Stuntz, “The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure” (1995) 105 Yale L.J.
393 [hereinafter “Stuntz”].
30
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
31
Later courts did, however, sometimes apply the mere evidence rule to other kinds of
evidence, such as clothing. See e.g., Morrison v. United States, 262 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1958); La Rue
v. State, 197 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Cr. App. 1946); Williams v. United States, 263 F.2d 487, at 488 (D.C.
Cir. 1959), cert denied, 365 U.S. 836 (1961); Hayden v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 363 F.2d 647 (4th
Cir. 1966). See also generally Steven Penney, “‘Mere Evidence’: Why Customs Searches of Digital
Devices Violate s. 8 of the Charter” (2016) 49:2 U.B.C. L. Rev. 485 at 492-93.
32
Stuntz, supra, note 29, at 423.
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Boyd did have the potential, however, to thwart the enforcement of
federal economic regulation.33 And so it did — to some extent. During
the Lochner years, courts frequently deployed the mere evidence rule to
prevent the government from compelling documents and testimony
in business regulation cases, including bankruptcy,34 antitrust35 and
white-collar fraud.36
As with Lochner, the courts did not always apply Boyd to prohibit
governmental intrusions on property rights and individual liberty.
Even in the prime of the Lochner era, the Court sometimes permitted
government to obtain documents characterized as either instrumentalities
of crime37 or legally required business records.38 And by mid-century,
many federal courts were stretching the instrumentality exception to the
point of gutting the rule.39 Finally, in Warden v. Hayden, the Supreme
Court discarded the mere evidence rule altogether.40 Justice Brennan
declared for the majority that “[t]he premise that property interests
control the right of the Government to search and seize has been
discredited” and that the “principal object” of the Fourth Amendment
“is the protection of privacy rather than property”.41 And since privacy
“is disturbed no more by a search directed to a purely evidentiary object
than it is by a search directed to an instrumentality, fruit, or contraband”,
it was “wholly irrational” to distinguish between the two categories.42
After Warden v. Hayden, Fourth Amendment cases would turn not on the

33

Id., at 425-27.
See, e.g., In re Harris, 164 F. 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1908); In re Hess, 134 F. 109 (E.D. Pa.
1905); Potter v. Beal, 49 F. 793 (C.C.D. Mass. 1892).
35
See e.g., Councilman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591,
at 606-608 (1896).
36
See, e.g., Gouled, supra, note 24.
37
See Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 24 S. Ct. 372 (1904); Marron v. United States,
275 U.S. 192, 48 S. Ct. 74 (1927); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, at 237-38, 80 S. Ct. 683
(1960); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, at 64, 70 S. Ct. 430 (1950); Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145, at 154, 67 S. Ct. 1098 (1947).
38
See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, at 74-75, 26 S. Ct. 370 (1906); Wilson v. United States,
221 U.S. 361, at 377-85, 31 S. Ct. 538 (1911); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 1375
(1948).
39
See, e.g., Golliher v. United States, 362 F.2d 594 (8th Cir. 1966); United States v. Guido,
251 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1958); Morton v. United States, 147 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1945); United States v.
Boyette, 299 F.2d 92 (4th Cir. 1962).
40
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) [hereinafter “Warden“]. See also Andressen v.
Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, at 471-73 (1976); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, at 405-14 (1976).
41
Warden, id., at 304.
42
Id., at 301-302.
34
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form of evidence, but rather simply “reasonableness”, which presumptively
entails warrants based on probable cause.43
Though Boyd never became as reviled as Lochner,44 commentators
have long denounced the mere evidence rule that it proclaimed.45
The distinction between inadmissible mere evidence and admissible
instrumentalities, critics asserted, was incoherent.46 Even worse, the rule
thwarted legitimate law enforcement efforts47 and perversely protected
wrongdoing (economic and otherwise).48 Like Lochner, Boyd ultimately
came to be viewed as a formalist anachronism, incompatible with
modern conceptions of legal pragmatism, policing and economic
regulation.49 Relatedly, Boyd was also, as Lochner’s ideological cousin, a
product of the Supreme Court’s revanchist hostility to the emergent
welfare state.50

43

Id., at 309-10.
Citing the significant negative academic commentary on Lochner would require an
article-length footnote. For a summary of leading contributions, see Sujit Choudhry, “The Lochner
Era and Comparative Constitutionalism” (2004) 2 Int. J. Constitutional Law 1, at 4-15 [hereinafter
“Choudhry”].
45
See 8 Wigmore, Evidence, §§2184a, 2264 (McNaughton rev., 1961); John MacArthur
Maguire, Evidence of Guilt: Restrictions upon its Discovery or Compulsory Disclosure (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1959), at §5.04; “Eavesdropping Orders and the Fourth Amendment”,
Comment (1966) 66 Colum L. Rev. 355, at 359-70; Charles T. Newton Jr., “The Mere Evidence
Rule: Doctrine or Dogma?” (1967) 45 Tex. L. Rev. 526; Zechariah Chafee Jr., “The Progress of the Law,
1919-1922: Evidence III” (1922) 35 Harv. L. Rev. 673, at 699-700; John Kaplan, “Search and
Seizure: A No-Man’s Land in the Criminal Law” (1961) 49 Cal. L. Rev. 474, at 477-79; William T. Rintala,
“The Mere Evidence Rule: Limitations on Seizure under the Fourth Amendment” (1966) 54 Cal. L.
Rev. 2099 [hereinafter “Rintala”]; David R. Manwaring, “California and the Fourth Amendment”
(1964) 16 Stan. L. Rev. 318, at 327-28; “Limitations on Seizure of ‘Evidentiary’ Objects: A Rule in
Search of a Reason”, Comment (1953) 20 U. Chicago L. Rev. 319, at 320-22 [hereinafter “Chicago
Comment”].
46
See Newton, id., at 542-45; Kamisar, infra, note 48, at 916-18; Chicago Comment, id.
47
See Rintala, supra, note 45, at 2100-101.
48
See Yale Kamisar, “The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Professor’s View”
(1960) 44 Minn. L. Rev. 891, at 915-16; Roger J. Traynor, “Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty
States” [1962] Duke L.J. 319, at 331.
49
See Amar, supra, note 21, at 791; Cloud, supra, note 21, at 560-61; William J. Stuntz,
The Collapse of American Criminal Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011),
at 198. Boyd, and to a lesser degree, Lochner, have lately been rehabilitated in some quarters of the
legal academy. See generally Cloud, supra, note 21; Dripps, supra, note 22; Randy E. Barnett,
Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 2004); David E. Bernstein, Rehabilitating Lochner: Defending Individual Rights Against
Progressive Reform (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2011).
50
See Cloud, supra, note 21, at 571-73; Thomas Y. Davies, “The Supreme Court Giveth
and The Supreme Court Taketh Away: The Century of Fourth Amendment ‘Search And Seizure’
Doctrine” (2010) 100 J. Crim L. & Criminology 933, at 965.
44

(2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d)

CRIMINAL-ADMINISTRATIVE DISTINCTION

315

III. LOCHNER AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE-CRIMINAL
DISTINCTION IN CANADA
Unsurprisingly, Canadian courts’ distaste for Lochner51 has been most
evident when claimants have asserted proprietary or contractual claims
under the Charter. In his concurring reasons in the Prostitution Reference,
for example, Lamer J. rejected the notion that the right not to be deprived
of “liberty … except in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice” under section 7 contemplated economic liberty.52 Lochner and its
siblings, he stressed, “have a specific historical context, a context that
incorporated into the American jurisprudence certain laissez-faire
principles that may not have a corresponding application to the
interpretation of the Charter in the present day”.53 Similar sentiments have
been expressed in other Supreme Court54 and lower court opinions.55
51
On the antipathy towards Lochner of the Charter’s drafters and judicial interpreters, see
generally Choudhry, supra, note 44; K. Michael Stephens, “Fidelity to Fundamental Justice: An
Originalist Construction of Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (2002)
13 N.J.C.L. 183; Ian Greene, The Charter of Rights (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1989), at 146;
Peter W. Hogg, “Canada’s New Charter of Rights” (1984) 32 Am. J. Comp. L. 283, at 290 [hereinafter
“Hogg”]; Patrick J. Monahan, Politics and the Constitution: The Charter, Federalism and the
Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1987), at 76; Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of
Canada, 5th ed. (supplemented), vol. 2, loose-leaf (Toronto: Carswell, 2007), at §§ 36.4(b), 47.7(b).
52
Reference re Criminal Code (Canada) ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code
(Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 (S.C.C.), affg [1987] M.J. No. 453 (Man. C.A.),
Lamer J., concurring. In his plurality reasons in the Prostitution Reference, Dickson C.J.C. expressly
declined to decide whether liberty or security of the person “could ever apply to any interest with an
economic, commercial or property component” (at para. 15, emphasis in original). See also R. v.
Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, at para. 150 (S.C.C.),
Dickson C.J.C. (“Whatever the precise contours of ‘liberty’ in s. 7, I cannot accept that it extends to
an unconstrained right to transact business whenever one wishes.”); Bernard v. Dartmouth Housing
Authority, [1988] N.S.J. No. 283, 53 D.L.R. (4th) 81 (N.S.C.A.), leave to appeal refused (1989), 89
N.S.R. (2d) 270n (S.C.C.).
53
Id., at para. 60.
54
See e.g., Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alberta), [1987] S.C.J.
No. 10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, at 412 (S.C.C.), affg [1984] A.J. No. 616 (Alta. C.A.), McIntyre J.,
concurring (“It is also to be observed that the Charter, with the possible exception of s. 6(2)(b) (right
to earn a livelihood in any province) and s. 6(4), does not concern itself with economic rights.”);
R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 138-39 (S.C.C.), revg [1985] O.J.
No. 2662 (Ont. C.A.), McIntyre J., dissenting (“The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner … and like
cases — that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the
legislature has acted unwisely — has long since been discarded.”); Children’s Aid: B. (R.) v. Children’s
Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315, at 370 (S.C.C.), affg
[1992] O.J. No. 1915 (Ont. C.A.) (referring to the “Lochner era” as a “much criticized period in
which the Supreme Court engaged in substantive review of many economic and social statutes.”);
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, 2005 SCC 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, at
paras. 201-202 (S.C.C.), revg [2002] J.Q. no 759 (Que. C.A.), Binnie and LeBel JJ., dissenting; Irwin
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Lochner has also been disapproved of in Canadian Bill of Rights
cases. Though section 1(a) of the Bill of Rights expressly protects the
right not to be deprived of the “enjoyment of property” except by “due
process of law”, courts have consistently rejected challenges to
legislatively authorized government takings.56 And in finding that
section 1(a) did not preclude Parliament from preventing disabled
veterans from claiming interest owed to them on trust moneys held by
the government, the Supreme Court noted that Lochner “might have cast
a shadow over the recognition of substantive due process rights in
Canadian jurisprudence”.57
The negative reception of Lochner in Canada extended to criminal
quasi-criminal law and helped shape the administrative-criminal
distinction. In R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc.,58 the appellant was
charged with disseminating false or misleading advertising under the
Competition Act.59 Like many regulatory statutes, the Act imposed “strict
liability” for violations of its prohibitions. As a consequence, the offence
was deemed to be established upon proof of the actus reus (i.e., that the
advertising was objectively misleading), but permitted a defence of “due
diligence” if the defendant could prove, on a balance of probabilities,

Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at 1003-1004
(S.C.C.), revg [1986] J.Q. no 1650 (Que. C.A.) (contrasting s. 7 of Charter with Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment due process clauses and asserting that economic rights not generally within scope of
Charter protection).
55
See e.g., Mathew v. Canada, [2002] T.C.J. No. 222, at paras. 359, 460-469 (T.C.C.), affd
[2003] F.C.J. No. 1470 (F.C.A.), affd [2005] S.C.J. No. 55, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 643 (S.C.C.); Gosselin
v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1999] J.Q. no 1365 (Que. C.A.), affd [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002]
4 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.); Skalbania (Trustee of) v. Wedgewood Village Estates Ltd., [1989] B.C.J.
No. 965, 60 D.L.R. (4th) 43, at paras. 28-29 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1989] S.C.C.A. No 274
(S.C.C.); Archibald v. Canada, [1997] F.C.J. No. 394, [1997] 3 F.C.R. 335 (F.C.T.D.), affd [2000]
F.C.J. No. 857 (F.C.A.); Smith, Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General),
[1986] 1 F.C. 274, at 314 (F.C.T.D.), affd [1986] F.C.J. No. 787, [1987] 2 F.C. 359 (F.C.A.).
56
Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44 [reproduced in R.S.C. 1985, App. III]. See
Authorson v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] S.C.J. No. 40, 2003 SCC 39, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 40,
at para. 51 (S.C.C.) (“The Bill of Rights does not protect against the expropriation of property by
the passage of unambiguous legislation.”). See also generally Manitoba Fisheries Ltd. v. The
Queen, [1978] S.C.J. No. 78, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 101 (S.C.C.), revg [1977] F.C.J. No. 165 (F.C.A.);
Wells v. Newfoundland, [1999] S.C.J. No. 50, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199, at para. 41 (S.C.C.), affg [1997]
N.J. No. 250 (Nfld. C.A.).
57
Authorson, id., at para. 49. See also Curr v. The Queen, [1972] S.C.J. No. 66, [1972]
S.C.R. 889, at 902 (S.C.C.), affg [1971] O.J. No. 1618 (Ont. H.C.J.).
58
[1991] S.C.J. No. 79, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154 (S.C.C.), varg [1989] O.J. No. 1971 (Ont. C.A.)
[hereinafter “R. v. Wholesale Travel“].
59
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23, s. 36(1).
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that it took reasonable care to prevent the error.60 The Court had
previously held in criminal cases that imposing a persuasive burden on
the accused (i.e., a reverse onus) to establish a defence infringed the
presumption of innocence in section 11(d) of the Charter, though in some
cases that infringement could be justified under section 1.61 And it has
since found that section 7 prohibits criminal liability (involving at least a
theoretical possibility of imprisonment) on anything less than “marked
departure” (i.e., gross negligence) standard of fault.62 But in Wholesale
Travel, it held that for regulatory or administrative infractions,
legislatures could always impose a reverse onus to prove due diligence.63
And it concluded that for such infractions, imposing the fault standard of
ordinary negligence did not violate section 7.
Each of the majority opinions in Wholesale Travel emphasized the
distinctiveness of regulatory offences and the social importance of easing
the prosecution’s burden in proving them. And in his lengthy exposition
on the criminal-regulatory distinction, Cory J. expressly invoked the
history of Lochner. He explained:
… [M]uch government regulation is designed to protect the vulnerable.
It would be unfortunate indeed if the Charter were used as a weapon to
attack measures intended to protect the disadvantaged and comparatively
powerless members of society. It is interesting to observe that in the
United States, courts struck down important components of the program

60

Id., s. 37.3(2). To escape liability after proof of the actus reus, this provision also
required the defendant to establish that it made reasonable and timely efforts to notify the targets of
the advertising. The Court unanimously held that these requirements exceeded the scope of the
ordinary due diligence defence and were consequently unconstitutional: R. v. Wholesale Travel,
supra, note 58, at 188-95, Lamer C.J.C., dissenting, 252-53, Cory J., 255, Iacobucci J., 260,
McLachlin J.
61
See R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.), affg [1983] O.J.
No. 2501 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Whyte, [1988] S.C.J. No. 63, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.), affg [1983]
B.C.J. No. 2452 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Chaulk, [1990] S.C.J. No. 139, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303 (S.C.C.).
62
For a limited category of very serious offences carrying a sufficiently high degree of
stigma, s. 7 is violated where fault can be established by anything less than (subjective) recklessness.
See R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.), revg [1984] J.Q. no 166
(Que. C.A.) (murder); R. v. Logan, [1990] S.C.J. No. 89, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 731 (S.C.C.), affg [1988]
O.J. No. 2107 (Ont. C.A.) (attempted murder); R. v. Finta, [1994] S.C.J. No. 26, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701
(S.C.C.), affg [1992] O.J. No. 823 (Ont. C.A.) (war crimes and crimes against humanity).
63
The route to this conclusion varied slightly as between the two judgments in the majority.
Justice Iacobucci found that the reverse onus in regulatory offences, as in criminal offences,
infringed s. 11(d). He concluded, however, that this infringement was justified under s. 1, not just for
the impugned Competition Act provisions, but for all regulatory offences. Justice Cory found that
regulatory reverse onuses do not even infringe s. 11(d).
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of regulatory legislation known as “the New Deal”. This so-called
“Lochner era” is now almost universally regarded by academic writers
as a dark age in the history of the American Constitution. 64

The criminal-administrative binary also plays a critical role in
section 8 Charter doctrine. To be considered reasonable under that
provision, searches or seizures in criminal investigations must comply
with more demanding standards than those in administrative inquiries.65
In the former, section 8 often requires warrants based on probable
grounds. In the latter, authorities are frequently free to search without
satisfying either of these conditions.66 Statutory powers compelling the
production of business and tax records, for example, do not generally
require either prior authorization or objective grounds for suspicion.67
The Court has also upheld powers to inspect businesses for regulatory
compliance without warrants or objective grounds for suspicion.68
To comply with section 8, investigators need only show that they acted
in good faith in pursuit of legitimate regulatory objectives.69 Broad
surveillance powers, the Court has stated, are necessary for the effective
regulation of industrial and economic activity.70 Requiring warrants and

64

R. v. Wholesale Travel, supra, note 58, at 233-34.
See generally Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and
Research, Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), [1990] S.C.J. No. 23, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425
(S.C.C.), affg [1986] O.J. No. 1066 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Thomson“].
66
See, e.g., Thomson, id., at 506-507, La Forest J.; R. v. Jarvis, [2002] S.C.J. No. 76,
[2002] 3 S.C.R. 757, 2002 SCC 73 at para. 72 (S.C.C.); 143471 Canada Inc. v. Quebec (Attorney
General); Tabah v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1994] S.C.J. No. 45, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 339, at 378
(S.C.C.), affg [1992] J.Q. no 292 (Que. C.A.), Cory J.; Comité paritaire de l’industrie de la chemise
v. Potash; Comite paritaire de l’industrie de la chemise v. Selection Milton, [1994] S.C.J. No. 7,
[1994] 2 S.C.R. 406, at 420-21 (S.C.C.), revg [1992] J.Q. no 1012 (Que. C.A.) [hereinafter “Comité
paritaire”]; R. v. Fitzpatrick, [1995] S.C.J. No. 94, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 154, at para. 49 (S.C.C.); R. v.
McKinlay Transport Ltd., [1990] S.C.J. No. 25, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 627, at 649-50 (S.C.C.), affg [1987]
O.J. No. 1130 (Ont. C.A.), Wilson J. [hereinafter “McKinlay Transport Ltd.”].
67
See Thomson, supra, note 65; McKinlay Transport Ltd., id. (tax); R. v. Jarvis, [2002]
S.C.J. No. 76, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 757, 2002 SCC 73 (S.C.C.); R. v. Ling, [2002] S.C.J. No. 75, 2002
SCC 74, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 814 (S.C.C.), affg [2000] B.C.J. No. 2082 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Fitzpatrick, id.,
at paras. 49-51; British Columbia (Securities Commission) v. Branch, [1995] S.C.J. No. 32, [1995] 2
S.C.R. 3, at paras. 51-64 (S.C.C.), affg [1992] B.C.J. No. 164 (B.C.C.A.). See generally Steven Penney,
Vincenzo Rondinelli & James Stribopoulos, Criminal Procedure in Canada (Toronto: LexisNexis
Canada, 2011), at §§3.144-3.152.
68
See Comité paritaire, supra, note 66.
69
Id., at 422-23; Thomson, supra, note 65, at 531-32.
70
Thomson, supra, note 65.
65
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probable grounds would frustrate government’s ability to protect the
vulnerable and regulate in the public interest.71
Lastly, the distinction between criminal and administrative
wrongdoing lies at the heart of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on
section 11 of the Charter. As noted, the adjudicative fairness rights
enumerated in that provision attach only to persons “charged with an
offence”. The Court has interpreted this phrase to apply only to “persons
prosecuted by the State for public offences involving punitive sanctions,
i.e., criminal, quasi-criminal and regulatory offences, either federally or
provincially enacted”.72 As Justice Wilson elaborated for the majority in
Wigglesworth, this definition encompasses both proceedings that are
criminal by their “very nature” as well as those that “may lead to a true
penal consequence”.73 Penalties “intended to promote public order and
welfare within a public sphere of activity,” she wrote, fall within
section 11.74 Those imposed in “private, domestic or disciplinary matters
which are regulatory, protective or corrective and which are primarily
intended to maintain discipline, professional integrity and professional
standards or to regulate conduct within a limited private sphere of
activity” do not.75
In subsequent decisions, the Court has provided further guidance on
the meaning of each of these thresholds. In Shubley and Martineau, it
clarified that the “criminal in nature” test refers not to the “nature of the
act which gave rise to the proceedings, but the nature of the proceedings
themselves”.76 The fact that alleged wrongdoers could be prosecuted
criminally, therefore, does not mean that any non-criminal proceeding
71
Id., at 526. See also McKinlay Transport Ltd., supra, note 66, at 648, Wilson J. Not all
regulatory searches are exempt from the Hunter requirements. The Supreme Court noted in
Thomson, for example, that prior authorization on probable grounds was required in Hunter because
authorities could acquire sensitive personal information as well as business documents. Thomson,
supra, note 65, at 520-21. See also McKinlay Transport Ltd., supra, note 66, at 649, Wilson J.;
Baron v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 6, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 416 at 444-45. Warrants and probable
grounds are also presumptively required where the state’s “predominant purpose” is to uncover
evidence of “penal liability” rather than monitor regulatory compliance: see R. v. Jarvis, [2002]
S.C.J. No. 76, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 757, 2002 SCC 73 at paras. 2, 46, 88, and 99 (S.C.C.).
72
R. v. Wigglesworth, [1987] S.C.J. No. 71, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541, at 554 (S.C.C.), affg
[1984] S.J. No. 204 (Sask. C.A.) [hereinafter “Wigglesworth“].
73
Id., at 559.
74
Id., at 560.
75
Id.
76
R. v. Shubley, [1990] S.C.J. No. 1, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 3, at 18-19 (S.C.C.), affg [1988] O.J.
No. 57 (Ont. C.A.) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter “Shubley“]; Martineau v. Canada (Minister of
National Revenue), [2004] S.C.J. No. 58, 2004 SCC 81, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 737 (S.C.C.), affg [2003]
F.C.J. No. 557 (F.C.A.) (quoting Shubley, id.) [hereinafter “Martineau“].
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against them triggers section 11.77 If the proceedings to enforce the
prohibition and impose a penalty lack the conventional indicia of a
criminal prosecution (such as summons or arrest, the laying of an
information, or a trial in a court of criminal jurisdiction), they will be
considered administrative.78
The true penal consequence test will always be satisfied by the
possibility of imprisonment.79 It may also include a fine or other
monetary penalty, but only, as the Court explained in Martineau, one that
“by its magnitude” is imposed to redress “a wrong done to society at
large, as opposed to the purpose of maintaining the effectiveness” of a
discrete regulatory or disciplinary regime.80
IV. GUINDON AND GOODWIN
In Guindon, a lawyer was assessed a penalty of over a half million
dollars under the Income Tax Act for issuing charitable tax receipts based
on false statements.81 She successfully argued at the Tax Court of
Canada that she was “charged with an offence” under section 11 of the
Charter and was thus entitled to the rights set out in that provision. The
Federal Court of Appeal reversed, however, and that reversal was upheld
by the Supreme Court of Canada.82
Writing for the majority, Cromwell and Rothstein JJ. looked first to
the nature of the proceedings, examining both the legislative scheme and
the features of the process leading to the assessment. The scheme was
designed, they explained, to capture persons who help to prepare false
tax information and are either culpably aware of their actions or grossly
negligent.83 Penalties for such conduct, they concluded, “promote
77

Id. See also Martineau, id., at paras. 30-32.
See Martineau, supra, note 76, at para. 45.
79
Wigglesworth, supra, note 72.
80
Martineau, supra, note 76, at para. 60 (emphasis in original).
81
R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), s. 163.2(4) (“Every person who makes, or participates in,
assents to or acquiesces in the making of, a statement to, or by or on behalf of, another person …
that the person knows, or would reasonably be expected to know but for circumstances amounting to
culpable conduct, is a false statement that could be used by or on behalf of the other person for a
purpose of this Act is liable to a penalty in respect of the false statement.”).
82
The disposition of the appeal was unanimous, but three of the seven judges on the panel
declined to deal with the s. 11 issue, holding that: (i) Ms. Guindon failed to comply with the notice
requirement for constitutional challenges under the Tax Court of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-2;
and (ii) there were no grounds for the Court to exercise its discretion to hear the challenge despite
this failure. See Guindon, supra, note 3, Abella and Wagner JJ., concurring.
83
Id., at paras. 53-61.
78
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honesty and deter gross negligence, or worse, on the part of preparers,
qualities that are essential to the self-reporting system of income taxation
assessment”.84 The process employed to determine liability, they
noted, involved an audit, an opportunity for the individual to make
representations, a recommendation by the auditor to a review committee,
a provisional decision by that committee, a further opportunity for
representations, a final decision, a right of appeal to the Tax Court, and
in default of payment, a civil collection action.85 This process, they
asserted, stood in sharp contrast to the process for determining criminal
sanctions under the Act, which required the laying of an information and
a trial in a court of criminal jurisdiction.86 They accordingly concluded
that the scheme was not “criminal in nature”.87
In addressing the “true penal consequence” test, Cromwell and
Rothstein JJ. confirmed that the possibility of imprisonment always
triggers section 11.88 They also reiterated that a monetary penalty will do
so only when “it is, in purpose or effect, punitive”, considering the
“magnitude of the fine, to whom it is paid, whether its magnitude is
determined by regulatory considerations rather than principles of
criminal sentencing, and whether stigma is associated with the
penalty”.89 While there is no fixed upper limit on the magnitude of the
penalty, they wrote, to remain within the administrative realm the penalty
must not be “out of proportion to the amount required to achieve
regulatory purposes”.90 That said, large penalties may be justified to
deter “non-compliance with the administrative or regulatory scheme”91
and ensure that “the penalty is not simply considered a cost of doing
business”.92 They concluded that the scheme at issue, which involved a
84

Id., at para. 62.
Id., at paras. 66 and 90.
86
Id., at para. 67. See also Martineau, supra, note 76, at para. 45.
87
Id., at para. 73.
88
Id., at para. 76.
89
Id., at 76. See also Canada (Attorney General) v. United States Steel Corp., [2011] F.C.J.
No. 726, 2011 FCA 176, 333 D.L.R. (4th) 1, at paras. 76-77 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2011]
S.C.C.A. No. 364 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “United States Steel Corp.“].
90
Id., at para. 77.
91
Id. See also id., at para. 79.
92
See also Lavallee v. Alberta (Securities Commission), [2010] A.J. No. 144, 2010 ABCA
48, 474 A.R. 295 (Alta. C.A.), affg [2009] A.J. No. 21 (Alta. Q.B.), leave to appeal refused [2010]
S.C.C.A. No. 119 (S.C.C.); Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. Chatr Wireless Inc., [2013]
O.J. No. 3748, 2013 ONSC 5315 (Ont. S.C.J.); United States Steel Corp., supra, note 89, at para. 77;
Rowan v. Ontario Securities Commission, [2012] O.J. No. 1375, 2012 ONCA 208, at para. 49
(Ont. C.A.), affg [2010] O.J. No. 5681 (Ont. S.C.J.).
85
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maximum penalty of $100,000 plus the individual’s gross compensation
for each violation, “reflects the objective of deterring” the type of
misconduct targeted and did not therefore trigger the application of
section 11.93
Goodwin94 involved challenges under sections 11 and 8 of the
Charter to British Columbia’s Automatic Roadside Prohibition (“ARP”)
scheme.95 That scheme permitted police to administer an “approved
screening device” (“ASD”) demand to determine a driver’s blood alcohol
concentration. If the ASD revealed a reading above certain threshold, the
driver’s licence would be immediately suspended for a period between
three and 90 days and monetary costs and penalties imposed up to a
maximum of $4,000.96 Drivers could ask the Superintendent of Motor
Vehicles to review these penalties, but this review was restricted to the
questions of whether the applicant was the driver, the ASD registered the
designated threshold, or the driver unlawfully failed or refused to provide
a sample.97
Applying the framework established in Wigglesworth, Martineau
and Guindon, the Court unanimously (and somewhat summarily)
dismissed the claim that drivers subject to these penalties were “charged
with an offence” under section 11 of the Charter.98 It was “evident”,
Karakatsanis J. wrote, that the proceedings used to impose the penalties
were “of an administrative nature” and “not criminal”.99 “The proceedings

93
94

Guindon, supra, note 3, at para. 88.
Supra, note 4. The legislation was also (unsuccessfully) challenged on division of powers

grounds.
95
Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 318, ss. 94.1-94.6. As discussed, infra, the Act was
amended in several relevant ways between the time the actions in Goodwin were initiated and the
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision.
96
More specifically, if the reading was 0.08 (milligrams of alcohol / litre of blood) or
higher, the licence would be suspended for 90 days; if between 0.05 and 0.08, the licence would be
suspended for three, seven, or 30 days, depending on whether it was the driver’s first, second, or
subsequent infraction, respectively. In addition, depending on the length of the suspension and other
factors, the driver’s vehicle could also be impounded. See Goodwin, supra, note 4, at paras. 11-12;
Motor Vehicle Act, supra, note 95, ss. 215.41-215.46.
97
Goodwin, supra, note 4, at para. 12. The scheme was later amended to: (i) require “that a
police officer inform a driver of her right to request and be provided a second ASD test, and, where
two samples are provided, the lower of the two results is the basis for a driving prohibition”;
(ii) allow driver’s to challenge the accuracy of the device; and (iii) require police to provide the
Superintendent with information relating to the calibration of the ASD. See Goodwin, supra, note 4,
at para. 13.
98
Goodwin, supra, note 4, at paras. 39-47, Karakatsanis J. and para. 91, McLachlin J.,
dissenting.
99
Id., at para. 43.
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are initiated by the drivers themselves”, she added, and there are no
“prosecutions” or “criminal records” involved.
Nor, in her view, were the consequences imposed on drivers “truly
penal”.100 While the suspensions were “meaningful”, they were directly
related to the “regulatory terms and conditions under which a person
may be licensed to drive”.101 And while the financial burdens were
“significant”, the fine was capped at $500, with the remaining costs
connected to remedial programs (including ignition interlock devices)
“incidental to the scheme’s objective of getting drivers and vehicles off
the road”.102
The Court did find, however, that the lack of a meaningful
opportunity to challenge the reliability of an “over 0.08” reading violated
section 8 of the Charter and could not be saved by section 1. The absence
of the kinds of safeguards subsequently added by the legislature (such as
requiring police to inform drivers of their right to request a sample from
a second device and allowing the Superintendent to assess the device’s
accuracy) meant that the scheme was “unreasonable” under section 8 and
failed the “minimal impairment” branch of section 1.103
I do not take a position on whether people facing the administrative
penalties at issue in Guindon and Goodwin should be entitled to any of
the particular rights set out in section 11 of the Charter. I do claim,
however, that the Supreme Court’s construal of “charged with an
offence” is too restrictive. A more expansive interpretation would allow
courts to place meaningful limits on legislatures’ ability to impose
administrative penalties without complying with basic tenets of
adjudicative fairness. If compliance with these principles is truly
incompatible with regulatory efficacy, governments can justify
infringements of section 11 rights under section 1 of the Charter. This is
how many other Charter rights are interpreted,104 and there is little reason
to think that under such an approach Canadian courts would suddenly
attempt a Lochnerian dismantling of welfare state regulation. On the
100

Id., at para. 45.
Id., at para. 46.
102
Id.
103
Id., at paras. 64-85.
104
See e.g., the jurisprudence regarding ss. 2, 9, 10(b), 11(d), and 15 of the Charter, in which
the courts have interpreted the rights expansively while affording legislatures considerable latitude to
infringe under s. 1 in prescribed circumstances. See generally Hogg, supra, note 51, c. 38. Other
Charter rights, notably sections 7, 8, and 12, are almost never justified under section 1 because each
contains an internal limitation permitting courts to balance individual liberties against state interests
without resort to section 1. See Hogg, supra, note 51, §38.14.
101
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contrary, a more flexible reading of section 11 would give Canadians
confidence that, regardless of the legislature’s chosen means of
enforcement, they will be assured a minimal level of adjudicative
fairness in contesting substantial state-imposed penalties.
But why precisely is the current approach too restrictive? Consider
first the “criminal in nature” test. Curiously for a component of a
constitutional right, it is wholly (and I mean wholly) positivistic. It
provides no check whatsoever on a legislature’s ability to deny
adjudicative fairness to those facing governmental sanctions. The test
simply asks the reviewing court to examine and describe the enforcement
procedure dictated by the legislature. If that process includes the
conventional elements of a criminal or quasi-criminal prosecution (e.g.,
arrest and summons powers, the laying of an information, trial in a court
of criminal jurisdiction), it is “criminal in nature”; if not, it is
administrative. End of story.
Put differently, the Court has enlisted a method of statutory
interpretation (i.e., divining legislative purpose or intent) to determine
the scope of what should be a constitutional limit on governmental
power. The quantum of deference inhering in this approach is literally
infinite, exceeding even the minimal “rational basis” standard that
eventually replaced Lochner.105 The only effect of the “criminal in
nature” test, therefore, is to signal to legislatures that if they wish to
evade the strictures of section 11, they must avoid the accoutrements of
the criminal process in designing enforcement procedures.106
In theory, the “true penal consequence” test is not entirely devoid of
normativity. In practice, however, it imposes a virtually unattainable bar
on rights claimants. The only way for non-carceral sanctions to trigger
section 11 protection is to be “out of proportion” to regulatory objectives,
which may include large, deterrence-oriented fines.107 Deterrence,
however, is also one of the most important aims of criminal sanctioning.108
105

See Tribe, supra, note 18, at §8-7.
The Court has rightly rejected such positivistic constitutional review in its section 8
jurisprudence. See R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, 2004 SCC 67, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, at para.
42 (S.C.C.), revg [2003] O.J. No. 186 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, [1990]
3 S.C.R. 36 at 46 (S.C.C.), affg [1987] O.J. No. 267 (Ont. C.A.).
107
See cases cited supra, notes 89-93. See also Re Cartaway Resources Corp., [2004] S.C.J.
No. 22, 2004 SCC 26, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 672, at paras. 55-61 (S.C.C.), revg [2002] B.C.J. No. 2115
(B.C.C.A.).
108
See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 718(b). See also generally Allan Manson,
The Law of Sentencing (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001), at 43-46; Clayton C. Ruby, Gerald Chan &
Nader R. Hasan, Sentencing, 8th ed. (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2012), at 7-15.
106
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In almost any realm of commercial or financial activity, large fines or
monetary penalties will at least sometimes be necessary to deter
infractions. If section 11 can be evaded simply be adverting to such
(legitimate) objectives, administrative penalty schemes will almost never
fall within the provision’s scope. Indeed, in an overwhelming proportion
of cases, courts have found that the monetary penalties imposed or
available were justified on deterrence grounds and were thus not penal
consequences.109
The penal consequence test should therefore be reformulated to
impose some kind of bright-line limit on monetary penalties. The
quantum could vary according to prescribed circumstances, such as
whether the penalty would be imposed on an individual or a corporation.
In addition, it could be based on a relative rather than absolute value,
such as a fixed percentage of the maximum fine for any parallel penal
offence.110 However the limit is calculated, if it were exceeded, section 11
would apply, and the failure to afford any of its protections would
constitute a prima facie infringement.
The test should also be satisfied by sanctions imposing any
substantial constraint on liberty, such as the imposition of solitary or
close confinement for a breach of custodial disciplinary rules,111 or even
the suspension or revocation of a licence, as in Goodwin.112 Such
penalties can cause considerable social, financial and psychological harm
and should not be levied without a presumptive constitutional entitlement
to basic adjudicative fairness.113
If the penal consequences test were interpreted in this manner, many
administrative penalty regimes would come under the protection of
section 11. In some of these cases, granting certain section 11 rights
could unduly diminish the state’s ability to regulate in the public interest.
But this consequence should not be assumed; governments should be
required to demonstrate it. Imposing a justification requirement in
section 11 cases would be far from radical, and far from Lochnerian.
109
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After all, a vast quantity of regulatory law is enforced (by legislative
choice) through quasi-criminal procedures and punishments.114 There is
little evidence that the application of section 11 to these processes has
emboldened wrongdoers, gutted enforcement, or induced the collapse of
any regulatory regimes. Requiring the state to justify elisions of basic
adjudicative fairness norms is one thing; striking down maximum hours,
workplace safety, and minimum wage laws as violations of economic
due process is another.
The weakness of the Supreme Court of Canada’s application of the
administrative-criminal distinction to section 11 law is further illustrated
by the section 8 analysis in Goodwin. As mentioned, there the Court
found that denying drivers a meaningful chance to challenge the
reliability of the ASD reading violated section 8. While the Court’s
policy objective was laudable — imposing an entitlement to basic
adjudicative fairness — the use of section 8 to achieve that objective was
frankly bizarre. The right to be free from unreasonable search or seizure
has always been interpreted to limit the state’s capacity to invade privacy
to investigate and prosecute wrongdoing.115 It plays no role in fostering
adjudicative accuracy. Indeed, successful section 8 applications often
lead to the exclusion of reliable evidence under section 24(2) of the
Charter, a consequence at odds with the goal of accurately determining
the factual basis of the state’s allegations.116 Section 8 is not concerned
with the ex post reliability of adjudication on the merits, but rather the ex
ante accuracy of investigative officials’ predictions of wrongdoing.117
Section 8 presumptively requires warrants and probable grounds, for
example, not to ensure adjudicative accuracy but prevent unjustified
investigative intrusions into privacy.
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Justice Karakatsanis’s majority judgment in Goodwin appears
oblivious to these tenets. Under the impugned British Columbia
legislation, police could issue an ASD demand in the same circumstances
as they could under the Criminal Code.118 The Code permits, and courts
have upheld under section 8, ASD demands when police reasonably
suspect impairment.119 The invasion of privacy occasioned by an ASD
demand under the provincial law, in other words, is no less justified than
under the Criminal Code. The ex ante probability of wrongdoing in each
case is the same.
Of course, the consequences of a failed ASD test differ under the two
regimes. Under the Code, a failed test gives police probable grounds to
arrest and issue a demand for a (more accurate) breathalyzer test, the
results of which are admissible at trial to prove liability (the ASD reading
is not admissible for this purpose).120 Under the British Columbia Act, in
contrast, police were required to issue the driving prohibition when they
had probable grounds to believe, based on the ASD reading, that the
driver was impaired.121 The ASD result was thus considered directly in
determining liability.
But this difference should not be relevant to section 8. Indeed, under
the Code a failed ASD test results in much more privacy-invasive
consequences (e.g., arrest, continued detention, further takings of bodily
samples) than under the provincial law. All of the concerns raised by
Karakatsanis J. relate to adjudicative accuracy, not privacy. Indeed, they
fall naturally within the parameters of the right to a “fair and public
hearing” in section 11(d) of the Charter. But since she excluded the
regime from the scope of section 11, this option was not available.
Instead, the manifest unfairness of the situation compelled her to impose
adjudicative norms by other means. Unfortunately, these norms fit
awkwardly with section 8’s language and purpose and do considerable
violence to the conceptual coherence of the jurisprudence. One can only
hope that future courts will ignore this unfortunate analysis.

118
119

Motor Vehicle Act, supra, note 95, s. 215.41(3)(a).
Criminal Code, s. 254(2)(b); Goodwin, supra, note 4, at para. 97, McLachlin C.J.C.,

dissenting.
120

See generally R. v. Bernshaw, [1995] S.C.J. No. 87, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 254 (S.C.C.), revg
[1993] B.C.J. No. 2213 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Yates, [2014] S.J. No. 233, 2014 SKCA 52 (Sask. C.A.),
revg [2013] S.J. No. 432 (Sask. Q.B.).
121
Motor Vehicle Act, supra, note 95, at s. 94.1.

328

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d)

V. CONCLUSION
Canadian courts were right to be skeptical of Lochner, but the fear
that it fostered has become anachronistic. Early on, some commentators
on the left predicted that the Charter would be used by Lochnerian judges
to dismantle the Canadian welfare state.122 Just as with concerns from
segments of the right that the Charter would gut legislative supremacy,123
these predictions have proved inaccurate. The state’s involvement in the
economy and regulation of enterprise is alive and well, and judges have
exhibited little appetite for resisting it.
Unfortunately, the doctrinal structures that emerged out of the fear of
Lochner continue to hamper the development of a more nuanced,
pragmatic and protective framework for assuring adjudicative fairness in
administrative penalty schemes. Guindon and Goodwin represent missed
opportunities to transform the crude criminal-administrative binary into a
flexible continuum capable of achieving a better balance between
individual and collective interests.
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